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The Application of EC Competition Policy to the Media Industry  
 
This article examines whether EC competition policy and merger control provisions can 
prevent excessive market power and safeguard open access and consumer choice in the 
European media and communications industry. The study looks at the structure of the 
media industry and points to the amalgamation of corporate power. It assesses whether 
EC competition law and merger provisions can effectively address the dangers of 
ownership concentration and safeguard diversity of sources. A number of merger cases 
either blocked or allowed by the EC are reviewed in order to establish the level of 
competition. The article suggests that a more rigorous competition policy is required to 
guarantee competition and prevent domination in merger activity. 
 
The Structure of the European Media and Communications Industry 
 
The global media and communications industry is characterised by consolidation, i.e. the 
formation of industrial alliances between players. The result of this procedure is the 
creation of larger and fewer powerful media groups controlled by fewer hands. As noted 
by Bagdikian (2000), in 1983 fifty corporations dominated
1
 the media field and the 
biggest media merger in history was a $340 million deal. In 1990 the fifty firms had 
shrunk to twenty-three, whereas in 1997 the biggest companies numbered ten and 
involved the $19 billion Disney-ABC deal, at the time the biggest media merger ever. 
The 2000 AOL-Time Warner‟s $135 billion merged corporation was more than 500 times 
larger than the deal of 1983.  
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Concentration of capital and control of information flow in an ever smaller number of 
multinational conglomerates is also evident in Europe (Murdoch, 2000; Iosifidis, 
Steemers & Wheeler, 2005). There were just seven major companies operating in the 
continent in 2004: Germany‟s media conglomerate Bertelsmann - a powerhouse of 
integrated communication, media and entertainment in numerous countries, Italy‟s 
Fininvest - owned by the Berlusconi family, France‟s Lagardere Media, John Malone‟s 
Liberty Media - controlling the United Pan-Europe Communications (UPC - Europe‟s 
largest cable operator) and part of cable network Telewest, Murdoch‟s News Corporation 
- its media holdings extend to the US, Europe, Australia, Latin America and Asia, 
Luxembourg‟s SBS Broadcasting, and NBC-Universal - owner of television network 
NBC and Universal studios which were acquired from French company Vivendi in 2003 
(Kevin, D., Ader, T., Fueg, O., Pertzinidou, E., & Schoenthal, M., 2004, pp. 242-243). 
 
The media business has been seen to lend itself to consolidation, as there are enormous 
economies of scale and scope that come from enlarging their footprint both at a national 
and international levels as the greater the proportion of the population that can be reached 
by a production, the greater the efficiency that can be consequently made. This increased 
commercial activity also stems from the high costs involved in keeping up with new 
technologies. Companies often decide to ally or merge with their competitors in order to 
share the high cost (and risk) in taking new initiatives. Such alliances may have negative 
effects on relevant markets and raise competition concerns as they result in increased 
concentration or foreclosure agreements (see below). Competition law intervenes (or 
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should intervene) to ensure that the market is contestable and open for competing 
operators.      
 
EC Competition Law and Market Definition 
 
The European Union‟s competition policy framework lies in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty. Competition policy is concerned firstly with preventing agreements between 
undertakings which reduce the effectiveness of the competitive process, secondly with 
controlling mergers which increase the probability of exercising excessive market power, 
and thirdly with anti-competitive behavior which enables firms either to acquire 
excessive market power or to increase barriers to entry for newcomers. The main 
objectives of competition rules are first to foster technological innovation and price 
competition, and second to guarantee consumer choice. As a former European 
Commissioner for Competition Policy has asserted, this is achieved by ensuring that 
companies compete rather than collude, that market power is not abused and that 
efficiencies are passed on to final consumers (Monti, 2001).  
 
Competition rules apply equally to all parts of the economy, but intervention in the media 
and telecommunications cases has in recent years become more frequent than in other 
sectors. This is both due to the size of the transactions and because the media and 
telecommunications companies have developed a complex web of commercial 
interrelationships and agreements with partners that require investigation (see below). 
However, in order to determine the acceptable levels of consolidation and the effects this 
 4 
phenomenon may have on company performance and the diversity of opinion and 
democracy, one has to define the relevant market for which market shares would be 
calculated. A concept of the market is necessary to make use of levels of concentration. 
Frazer (1992, pp. 13-16) argued that in order to assess whether monopolistic situations 
exist, one must define both the geographical scope of the market and the product market. 
The geographical dimension of market definition determines the scope of the market that 
is, whether markets are defined as being local, regional, national, or even international. 
The issue of the relevant geographic market being examined is particularly important, as 
the adaptation of either narrow or wide market definitions may lead to different results in 
measuring levels of concentration (Iosifidis, 1997). Some suppliers may operate 
nationally offering programming of national interest, so that a broad market definition is 
needed to cover the entire country in question. However, the growing internationalisation 
of broadcasting and telecommunications may mean that some relevant markets are larger 
than individual countries. 
 
Markets also need to be defined by reference to specific, well-defined products if they are 
to be useful in assessing competition. In the past, the definition of media product markets 
was relatively easy, as consumers were exposed to a small range of homogeneous media 
services that were clearly distinguished from one another. The difference, for example, 
between a TV service and a telecommunications service was obvious and this led to 
broad, loosely-defined markets such as „television‟ and „telecommunications‟. However, 
new broadcast delivery methods such as cable and satellite as well as the development of 
new programme services have increased the substitutes available for any particular 
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service and have complicated the definition of product markets. The convergence of 
technologies has added to the confusion. As the distinction between both electronic and 
non-electronic media and terrestrial broadcast TV and telecommunications services 
becomes blurred, so does the definition of the relevant product market. It is now 
extremely difficult to determine which products or services are sufficiently close 
substitutes to be in the same product market.  
 
For example, is pay-TV a substitute for free-to-air television? The European Commission 
(EC) has in various decisions
2
 defined pay-TV as a separate market. For example, in the 
MSG case the EC argued that: 
 
Pay TV constitutes a relevant product market that is separate from commercial 
advertising-financed television and from public television financed through fees 
and partly through advertising. While in the case of advertising-financed 
television, there is a trade relationship only between the programme supplier and 
the advertising industry, in the case of pay-TV there is a trade relationship only 
between the programme supplier and the viewer as subscriber (Commission 
decision IV/M.469 – MSG Media Service, paragraph 32; see also the Commission 
decision IV/M.410 Kirch/Richmond/Telepiu).  
 
Pay-TV is clearly different from free-to-view television insofar as there is a direct 
pecuniary exchange between a pay-TV operator and the viewer (subscriber). Nonetheless, 
this does not constitute grounds for placing the two in separate markets. A report by 
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Europe Economics (2002) rejects the idea that pay-TV is necessarily in a separate market 
simply because viewers pay the broadcaster, and suggests that there may be cases in 
which the supply of pay-TV package would be defined within the same market as the 
supply of free-to-air content. 
 
In MSG, the Commission observed that pay-TV and free access, advertising-funded 
programmes differ in content, the former leaning more towards specialist, and that pay-
TV channels would not generally show advertising, but according to Europe Economics 
(2002) it is not clear how there arguments constitute an analysis of substitutability 
between pay-television and free-to-view television. After all, the two types of 
broadcasting could conceivably compete for viewers‟ attention. Furthermore, pay-TV can 
be a substitute for free-to-air television because every subscriber of pay-TV already has 
access to free-to-air television. Finally, the distinction between the two markets becomes 
blurred in the case of pay-TV programmes that are financed from a mixture of sources 
(e.g. subscription fees and advertising). However, Europe Economics argued that there 
may well be a specific demand for premium content (e.g. live football games), in which 
case there would be grounds for defining the supply of the premium pay-TV package in a 
separate market from free-to-air television.  
 
Still, the EC‟s decision that a pay-TV operator always competes in a separate market 
from free-to-air broadcasters may be incorrect. In fact, analysis is required to assess 
whether the viewing patterns available to a consumer with access to both a pay-TV 
package and free-to-air television are good substitutes for the viewing patterns available 
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to a consumer with access to free-to-air television only. But how does the EC‟s decision 
affect the investigation of merger cases? As it will be shown below, in the merger 
between Vivendi, Canal Plus and Seagram
3
 the pay-TV operator Canal Plus was allowed 
to have first-window rights access to Universal‟s films (following some concessions on 
behalf of the operator) as it was thought that its activities in pay-TV would not adversely 
affect free-to-view channels. This covered the territories Canal Plus was active (i.e. 
France, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the Nordic countries).  
 
Merger Control 
 
In addition to competition rules, a Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between 
Undertakings was adopted by the Council of the European Economic Community in 1989 
and became effective on 21 September 1990. The Merger Regulation (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89) was intended to complement the European 
Commission‟s anti-trust powers conferred by Articles 81 and 82 (then Articles 85 and 86 
of the Rome Treaty) and also give the Commission pre-emptive powers to deal with 
mergers. Until 1989 the EC had powers to act against anti-competitive mergers and 
acquisitions only after they have taken effect and a restrictive practice or dominant 
position is established or strengthened. For many years the EC had argued that it should 
have new, pre-emptive powers that would remove the uncertainty of retrospective action 
for the parties involved. In fact, competition rules that intervene after a problem of 
imbalance has arisen (for example, an anticompetitive practice has been established or a 
dominant position has already been created) may not be able to remedy the situation. The 
 8 
Merger Regulation was intended to deal with that problem. This is becoming more 
important today because, in order to gain maximum benefit from the information society, 
„gate-keeping‟4 issues require a more direct anticipation in competition law. 
 
In December 2003 the EC adopted a package of merger control guidelines on the 
appraisal of mergers between competing firms (Horizontal Guidelines). The guidelines 
describe in detail the analytical approach the EC takes when assessing the likely impact 
on competition of mergers between competing firms. In particular the guidelines make it 
clear that mergers and acquisitions will be challenged only if they enhance the marker 
power of companies in a manner which is likely to have adverse consequences for 
consumers, notably in the form of higher prices, poorer quality products, or reduced 
choice. The guidelines complement the new wording of Article 2 of the Merger 
Regulation with respect to the substantive test that underpins merger reviews. In this 
context, the guidelines intend to ensure that the Commission‟s application of the Merger 
Regulation “is firmly grounded in sound economics” (Levy, 2005, p. 99). The new 
Regulation, which received the political backing of the Competitiveness Council on 27 
November 2003, provides for intervention in relation to any merger which “would 
significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position” (EC, 2003). The new Merger Regulation and the 
Horizontal Guidelines entered into force on 1 May 2004. 
 
The Effectiveness of the Merger Regulation 
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Under the Merger Regulation, the EC has exclusive jurisdiction for mergers between 
firms with an aggregate turnover of at least 5 billion Euros and a turnover within the 
European Economic Area of more than 250 million Euros for each of them. It becomes 
clear that the Regulation covers only large mergers that affect competition in the market 
in question. As a result it has allowed many mergers to proceed as they fell outside its 
scope (Iosifidis, 1996; Just & Latzer, 2000). In fact, the Merger Regulation has vetted 
over 2,300 cases since September 1990 and cleared the vast majority of them (over 90 per 
cent) after a routine one-month investigation. It has prohibited just 18 mergers in total, 
while a further 14 have been withdrawn when it became clear that regulators would veto 
them. Six of those cases were in the wider media and telecommunications sectors. The 
six cases were: MSG Media Service in 1994, Nordic Satellite Distribution in 1995, 
RTL/Veronica/Endemol (Case No IV/M.553 – RTL / Veronica / Endemol, OJ L 134/32, 
5.6.1996), Deutsche Telekom/Beta Research in 1998, Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere in 
1998 (MSG II), and WorldCom/Sprint in 2000. The AOL/Time Warner intended merger 
with EMI in 2000 withdrew after it became clear that the EC would prohibit it. 
 
Let us consider these merger cases blocked by the EC in some more detail in order to 
establish a clearer picture of the way the merger regulation is put into practice. A notable 
example is the blockage of the MSG Media Services case in 1994, a joint venture of the 
German giants Bertelsmann AG, Taurus of the (now bankrupt) Kirch Group and 
Deutsche Telekom - DT (then the monopoly provider of telephone service in Germany 
and owner of nearly all German broadband cable networks), aiming at supplying 
administrative and technical services to pay-TV operators. It was prohibited on the 
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grounds that it would have created a dominant position in three relevant markets - the 
administrative and technical services market, the pay-TV and the cable TV market. The 
Commission ruled that the monopoly position of the venture would not have been 
temporary, in particular because of: (a) all potential competing pay-TV providers‟ 
dependence on DT‟s cable network; (b) the parties‟ substantial existing customer bases 
(in cable network and analogue pay-TV) and distribution bases (store-front network for 
DT, book clubs for Bertelsmann); and (c) the parties‟ complementary strengths, in 
technology for DT and programming for Bertelsmann and Kirch (paragraphs 61-63).   
 
In May 1998 the EC decided to prohibit the so-called MSG II case, a proposed alliance 
involving once again Bertelsmann, Kirch, digital TV channel Premiere and Deutsche 
Telekom. All companies were to share control of Beta Research, a Kirch owned technical 
services outlet providing conditional access and subscriber management. The EC‟s veto 
was prompted by two concerns: first, that the merger between Bertelsmann, Kirch and 
Premiere would have an adverse impact on the market for pay-TV; second, that Beta 
Research would dominate the conditional access system through the proprietary nature of 
Beta-owned D-Box (Levy, 1999).  
 
A third example was the veto of the £75 billion deal between US telecommunications 
operators WorldCom and Sprint in June 2000. EC competition authorities considered at 
the time that the deal would have created a company with so much power over 
transmitting data on the Internet that it could have dictated prices and let to a raw deal for 
consumers. A merger without divestiture of its Internet business by either WorldCom or 
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MCI would have created a cooperative standard, with the subsequent dangers for 
consumers of Internet services. Concerns of this sort led the EC to insist on divestiture by 
WorldCom of its Internet business as a precondition for allowing the merger to go ahead. 
This case, involving two US companies, actually raised the EC‟s profile in antitrust 
investigations and mergers.
5
 
 
A fourth case was the blockage of the AOL/Time Warner merger with the British music 
group EMI in late 1999, on the grounds that a dominant position would arise in the music 
industry, including the distribution of music via the Internet. EC competition officials 
were concerned that the tie-up between EMI and Time Warner‟s music subsidiary could 
have placed 80 per cent of Europe‟s recorded music business in the hands of just four 
global giants – Vivendi‟s Universal Music, Bertelsmann‟s BMG Entertainment and Sony 
Music were the three other main players. The completion of the merger, according to the 
EC, would have resulted in price increases without the loss of market shares, thereby 
forcing competitors to exit the market and prohibiting access to newcomers. In fact, 
AOL/Time Warner and EMI withdrew their intention to merge after it became clear that 
the EC would block the $20 billion deal. EMI‟s withdrawal meant that the EC could clear 
the much bigger ($135 billion) merger between the Internet company AOL and giant 
entertainment conglomerate Time Warner. AOL/Time Warner was also forced to cut its 
links with the German conglomerate Bertelsmann, whose interests in music, publishing 
and broadcasting libraries would have created a concentration over content.    
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However, it does not appear that European regulators follow a consistent approach when 
addressing market imbalances in the music industry, for in July 2004 the EC approved 
the merger of Sony and BMG‟s respective music units. Whereas keeping AOL/Time 
Warner from swallowing EMI Music actually limited the immediate size of the combined 
company, and was therefore a plausible approach to ensure competition, sadly the EC 
competition authorities adopted a different approach four year later and allowed an 
equally big merger to proceed. The new firm, which is owned equally by Bertelsmann 
and Sony, brings together the two companies‟ huge record labels and music production. 
According to Nielsen SoundScan, the new firm accounts for 23 per cent of worldwide 
music sales, and one in three new releases in the US.
6
 It is clear that the deal strengthens 
a position of collective dominance, since it leaves 80 per cent of the market in the hands 
of a few giants – Sony/BMG, EMI and Warner Music Group, despite the Commission‟s 
determination that there was insufficient evidence to establish it.    
 
As already mentioned, the Merger Regulation has provided obstacles to just a few merger 
cases in the media and telecommunications sectors since its inception. The prohibitions 
of the merger cases listed above are the exception, rather than the rule. The process of 
industry convergence, resulting in numerous strategic alliances between previously 
separated companies, is seen quite favourably by the European Commission as this will 
lead to the creation of strong European companies capable of competing globally. Such 
activity was once looked upon with alarm by the Commission. Companies which have 
control of numerous assets also have the power to seize out any potential competitors 
with the result of distorting the economy with monopolistic controls over prices. But over 
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the years the EC has developed a more light-handed approach towards industry 
consolidation as demonstrated by the Sony/BMG case. 
 
This id also evidenced by the introduction of the new regulatory framework for electronic 
communications, which was adopted in 2002 and applied in July 2003.
7
 The very essence 
of the framework is that regulation must not separate markets, but must allow for their 
convergence; and that only minimum regulation should apply to the media and 
telecommunications markets to encourage investment. The new framework does not 
apply to content. The Framework Directive sets forth the new definition of “significant 
market power” (SMP). Under the old directives, the notion of SMP was tied to 25 per 
cent market share. This old market share test falls short of the traditional competition law 
threshold for “dominant position”. The new Framework Directive aligns the definition of 
SMP with the competition law definition of dominant position (generally market share 
exceeding 40-50 per cent).  
 
Under the new definition, an operator has significant market power if “either individually 
or jointly with others, it enjoys a position of economic strength affording it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately 
consumers”. The other controversial issue in the Framework Directive is the requirement 
that national regulatory authorities inform the EC and other national regulators ahead of 
time of proposed measures. The Commission insisted on maintaining some kind of 
control over national decisions, since under the new framework national regulators will 
have added freedom and there is consequently a risk of diverging rules emerging 
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throughout Europe. National decisions will be circulated among regulators in other 
European countries before being finally adopted, and other regulators, as well as the 
Commission, would have an opportunity to comment.   
 
Towards Vertically Integrated Empires 
 
In recent years merger cases have become more complex and entail increased 
competition concerns. The complexity of mergers is a result of a shift in the nature of 
industry concentration, from one based on horizontal mergers to those involving vertical 
integration, as operators sought out alliances which would enable them to acquire the 
broad set of skills needed to address new markets. Merger and other alliances can be 
horizontal, that is, between enterprises involved in the same sector, or vertical, involving 
firms operating in different sectors.
8
 The motives of such movements range from 
increasing market power and sharing the high cost of digital technologies (especially 
regarding horizontal mergers), to gaining access to know-how and acquiring contents (the 
case in vertical mergers). The common aim of those alliances is to address the (potential) 
opportunities offered by technological convergence (Iosifidis, 2002). However, the most 
common activity today is vertical integration, notably distribution companies seeking 
alliances with content providers and vice versa.  
 
Vertical integration is the extension of the functional boundaries of a company. Vertically 
integrated entities are mainly large firms, which have united several stages of the 
production and distribution processes under common ownership. Vertical integration may 
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intervene “upstream”, either to reduce costs (for example, control of the paper-making 
and printing industry by publishers) or to ensure priority in access to programmes (for 
example, control of audio-visual production by TV broadcasters), or “downstream” (for 
example, integration of advertising sales agencies by press groups or broadcasters). 
Vertical integration can enable a firm to gain monopolistic advantages through the 
creation of a barrier to entry. The vertical relationship will result in exclusion that may 
harm competition and may even increase or exploit market power. As McChesney (1999) 
put it, “vertical integration is a part of a business strategy that serves to enhance market 
power, by allowing cross-promotion and cross-selling media properties or „brands‟ across 
numerous, different sectors of the media” (p. 22).  
 
The next section looks at the competitive concerns arising from vertical mergers in the 
media and telecommunications markets and offers examples of merger cases reviewed 
(and allowed) by the European Commission to illustrate the points put forward.  
 
Competitive Assessment   
 
Vertical mergers in the media and telecommunications markets raise specific competitive 
concerns, not least because of the structure of these markets, which is multidimensional 
and complex. Different players such as content providers, right holders, content 
distributors, operate in the value chain from the production of content such as films, pay-
TV programming, and music, to its delivery via theatres, pay-TV channels or Internet 
portals. Second, as newly liberalised markets, the structure of media and 
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telecommunications is fairly unstable, with large incumbent operators often retaining 
dominant positions and forming oligopolies in new services. For most of its history the 
media and telecommunications sector has been run as a state-owned regulated monopoly, 
but markets opened up to competition throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Accompanying 
these trends was a process of deregulation, leaving competitive market forces to 
determine the shape of the sector. The debate around mergers and acquisitions and 
competition policy is very much related to this.  
 
A third element is the pace of innovation and technological changes that continuously 
affect the scope of relevant markets (new innovative services, technological 
convergence). Digital technology, in particular, has transformed the sector because it 
lowers the barriers to entry and greatly extends the scope of services that a service 
provider can offer. This allows new entrants to differentiate their products, segment the 
market and target specific audience segments. One example from the telecommunications 
industry is the introduction of the cellular mobile phone, widely regarded today as a close 
substitute for a fixed line telephone in markets where the latter is costly or difficult to 
access. Another example from the broadcasting industry is the launch of pay-TV services, 
but as already explained, it is not straightforward whether these services are a substitute 
for free-to-air television.  
 
Based on these characteristics we can identify the following main competitive concerns. 
The first is the combination of market power evidenced by high market shares and 
reinforced by vertical links. The $135 billion, all-stock AOL/Time Warner deal gave 
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AOL, the world's largest online access company, a new broadband distribution platform 
for its services, as well as new subscribers through New York-based Time Warner's 
media outlets. The merged entity has a very significant presence in the markets for 
Internet service and cable television that would leave consumers with higher prices and 
fewer choices. Another vertical merger that resulted in significant market power occurred 
in October 2003, when Vivendi agreed to merge Vivendi Universal Entertainment with 
the US television network NBC, a unit of General Electric, in a 43 billion Euro 
transaction to create a new entertainment industry giant. The deal brought together assets 
including Vivendi‟s Universal Pictures with NBC‟s broadcast network and cable 
channels CNBC and Bravo. General Electric now owns 80 per cent of the merged 
company while Vivendi holds 20 per cent.
9
  
 
A second concern arises where a distribution firm controls a “gateway” access to which is 
essential in order for upstream producers to be able to supply their content on 
downstream markets. This may be perceived as a bottleneck. A bottleneck facility or 
technology can be described as “a technology without access to which it would be 
difficult for a third party to provide a service to consumers” (Cowie & Marsden 1999, p. 
55). Although bottleneck facilities are not new in the communications industries, the 
transition to digital television and impending convergence introduces the potential for 
new series of bottlenecks related to set-top boxes, Application Programme Interfaces and 
Electronic Programme Guides (Cave & Cowie 1996, p. 119).  
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This is illustrated by the 2000 merger between the French media and telecommunications 
company Vivendi with the Canadian company Seagram. The $34 billion deal combined 
Seagram‟s sizable entertainment assets, which included Hollywood‟s Universal Studios 
and the Universal Music Group, with Vivendi‟s various distribution channels, most 
notably its subsidiary pay-TV operator Canal Plus. The EC was originally concerned that 
the deal would strengthen Vivendi/Canal Plus‟s position in pay-TV as well Internet 
markets (mostly by pooling of Seagram‟s Universal music arm in Vivendi‟s multi-access 
Internet portal Vizzavi), but allowed the merger following a package of commitments on 
behalf of the company. In particular, Vivendi divested its stake in British Sky 
Broadcasting (BSkyB) and gave rival pay-TV operators partial access to Universal‟s 
films. It also offered to provide access to rival portals to Universal‟s online music content 
for a period of five years. As a result of those concessions the EC declared the merger 
compatible with the common market (Case No COMP/M.2050). 
 
The merging parties belonged to three different categories of players. In terms of content, 
the merging parties had the world‟s second largest film library, the second largest library 
of TV programming in Europe, and a substantial part of theme channels production in 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Furthermore, the merged entity was the first acquirer 
of output deals signed with the US studios. With regard to music content, the merged 
entity was number one in recorded music. In terms of distribution, the parties were the 
leading pay-TV operators in a number of countries and became a leading player on 
Internet distribution via the multi-access portal Vizzavi. Vertical issues arose through the 
interaction of content providers and delivery operators such as pay-TV operators and 
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multi-access portals such as Vizzavi. Consequently, there were three markets which were 
vertically affected by the transaction: the pay-TV market, the emerging market for portals 
and the emerging market for online music.  
 
For simplicity and space saving reasons we focus on the pay-TV market. Following the 
vertical integration with Universal Studios transaction, Canal Plus‟s presence in a number 
of pay-TV markets was actually strengthened rather than reduced. At that time the major 
pay television company operated in eight countries and had about 14 million 
subscribers.
10
 Despite Vivendi/Canal Plus‟s concessions, the placement of Universal 
Studios under the company‟s control strengthened the pay-TV operator‟s position in pay-
TV and enhanced the pay-TV window for movies. This is because the television platform 
provider was already dominant in the market for providing TV channels with access to 
consumers and acted as a wholesaler of television programmes, purchasing programme 
rights and offering consumers a choice of packages together with the basic platform 
infrastructure. Even if multiple operators compete in a market for supplying pay-TV 
subscriptions to households, Canal Plus‟s set-top box proprietary technology can be seen 
as “closed” insofar as a subscriber can only be reached through an access service 
purchased from the subscriber‟s operator.  
 
Access to the subscriber-base on Canal Plus‟s platform cannot be perceived as a 
substitute for access to the subscriber-base on another platform simply because each 
provides access to a different set of potential customers. The provision of particular 
upstream content by Canal Plus (e.g. movies, football rights) affected the resultant 
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downstream subscriber-bases and it was a very important driver of subscriber numbers. 
Thus the concessions made on behalf of Vivendi/Canal Plus, as well as the competition 
from other pay-TV consortia, did not adversely affect Canal Plus‟s position in pay-TV 
markets. The situation would change radically with the imposition of a regulatory 
constraint that would require the platform operator to offer non-discriminatory access, but 
this was not pursued by the European Commission. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
Canal Plus‟s position was strengthened not only in the pay-TV market but also in relation 
to the free-to-view television. We previously rejected the idea that pay-TV is necessarily 
in a separate market from free-access television. This is partly because both types of 
broadcasting compete for viewers‟ attention.  
 
A third concern is the creation or the strengthening of dominant position by increase in 
market share (through product or geographical business overlaps). This concern is 
illustrated via the merger of CLT-UFA, Pearson TV and Audiofina, which created the 
RTL Group, Europe‟s leading radio, television and content group, with a consolidated net 
profit of 67 million Euros in the year 2000. This merger was the result of the strategy 
pursued by Audiofina to broaden its activities by increasing its holdings in existing 
private television channels, developing its content operations and accessing new national 
markets. The acquisition of Pearson Television provided the new group with a majority 
stake in the UK‟s television channel Five and broadened its position in the content sector. 
The EC decided not to oppose the merger and declared it compatible with the common 
market (Case No COMP/M.1958 – Bertelsmann / GBL / Pearson TV, 29.06.2000, OJ L-
2985). This is because the Commission has taken the view that TV broadcasting still 
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generally takes place on national markets. As outlined in several decisions of the 
Commission,
11
 the national character of TV broadcasting is mainly due to different 
regulatory frameworks, existing language barriers and cultural factors. Although we do 
not contest that TV markets are mainly national, the markets for sale of TV productions 
may be broader and comprise a particular language region. Similarly, the demand for 
content rights (sports or film rights) may be EC-wide or even world-wide. It follows that 
the relevant geographical market cannot always be limited to national borders.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The role of competition policy is crucial in order to guarantee a “level playing field”, 
preserve open access and prevent the formation of dominant positions in the media 
market. However, the established relationship between communications networks and 
owners of content has reduced its effectiveness in the field. Focusing on the volume and 
complexity of corporate alliances, this article showed that EC competition law and 
merger provisions cannot always effectively address the dangers of ownership 
concentration. Proponents of liberalisation argue that economic efficiency can often be 
improved, and innovation stimulated through well-designed mergers and acquisitions. 
Proof that a merger will be damaging to competition, the argument follows, should rest 
on the market outcome, and regulators should take a light-handed approach until 
evidence to the contrary arises. However, the paper showed that mergers and acquisitions 
can result in market imbalances in the form of anticompetitive practices and dominant 
positions. 
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This article suggests that a more rigorous competition policy is required to tackle 
consolidation trends in the media and communications markets. The EC should 
strengthen its role as central actor and take steps to establish appropriate alternative 
schemes in order to prevent the media industry from being dominated by gigantic media 
concerns only interested in profit maximization. The purpose of competition law is to 
secure an effective use of society‟s resources by creating conditions for real competition. 
However, an analysis of some past competition decisions in the media sector reveals, 
first, that the EC has become sympathetic to the formation of large corporations and 
second, that the EC does not follow a consistent competition approach. The practical 
problems that appear to have been encountered in dealing with market definition have 
added to the confusion. Still, competition legislation should apply equally and in a 
systematic way to all merger cases involving anti-competitive concerns. There is also a 
necessity to re-evaluate some of its fundamental concepts, as well as to expand the scope 
of the analysis to incorporate new economic models (i.e. vertical integration, 
convergence).  
 
The EC should build on the process of strengthening the economic approach in 
competition law to make the system more effective. Undoubtedly the Merger Regulation 
has transformed the use of economics in the EU and provided a sound analytical 
framework that is firmly grounded in economics. This is evidenced by the creation of a 
new position of Chief Economist in order to provide an independent economic opinion. 
As Levy (2005) reminds us, the Commission appointed its first Chief Economist in July 
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2003, to provide methodological guidance on economic policy, general guidance in 
individual cases, and detailed guidance in complex cases that require quantitative analysis 
(p. 124). Levy also argues that during the Commissioner Monti‟s tenure (1999-2004) “the 
Commission became more systematic and exacting with respect to the scope, 
implementation, and detail of remedies” (p. 126). Although this might be true, we believe 
that the EC has become more lenient in practicing its merger control in the media and 
communications field as demonstrated by the merger cases we studied. We appreciate 
that the EC has to maintain a delicate balance between the economic/industry argument 
of allowing European companies to become bigger and stronger in order to be able to 
compete globally, and the need to promote contestable markets and open competition. 
The protection of individual investors, in particular, stimulates economic investment, 
increases capital formation and plays a vital part in the development of newly invented 
products. This may justify the EC‟s emerging light-handed approach towards 
consolidated ownership. However, this approach has the potential to harm competition 
when high-profile cartel cases are at stake. 
 
In fact the market, left to weak and inconsistent competition scrutiny, favors 
concentration of media ownership, partly due to the high basic costs of access to the 
media, and partly due to the ability of powerful enterprises to penetrate any market. 
According to Graham and Davis (1997), high quality multimedia content is expensive to 
produce in the first place but, once created, relatively cheap to edit or to change and even 
cheaper to reproduce. Put it another way, it has high fixed costs and low marginal costs - 
the natural creators of monopolies. High quality material can still be produced and yet 
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cost very little per unit provided that it reaches a large number of people (exploiting 
economies of scale) and/or provided that it is used in a wide variety of different formats 
(exploiting economies of scope), but the exploitation of these economies of scale and 
scope imply concentration of ownership. Given the inexorable industry tendency towards 
further consolidation as well as the increased complexity of mergers in the age of digital 
convergence, we believe that a rigorous application of the competition law should be at 
the forefront of EC policy. Competition rules should be strong enough to prevent 
concentration of media power into the hands of a fewer and fewer media magnates, as 
demonstrated by the grand convergence of the previously disparate cultural industries.  
 
Of course one needs to study carefully how much competition a given market can sustain. 
There have been studies which emphasise that a too competitive market is equally 
harmful to diversity as a too concentrated market. For example, Van der Wurff and Jan 
van Cuilenburg (2001) analysed how competition in Dutch television broadcasting 
influences diversity of programme supply and concluded that moderate competition 
improves diversity, while ruinous competition produces excessive sameness. In addition, 
and as noted above, intense price competition in the high-fixed-cost and low-marginal-
cost broadcasting and telecommunications may lead some networks to exit the market. 
However, the broadcasting and telecommunications industries are by nature prone to 
monopolisation, and are thus a big concern for competition authorities. We have 
presented the relevance of the competition framework for a number of merger cases and 
shown that in some cases mergers were allowed to go ahead to the detriment of open 
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competition. We feel that many more cases are to come and argued that competition law 
needs to apply more vigorously to address the counter effects to market imbalances.  
 
Additionally, competition policy should recognise the specific cultural and democratic 
significance of the media industries as opposed to other industries when investigating 
mergers and acquisitions. Due to the specific nature of this form of economic activity, the 
application of competition rules to the media industry cannot always safeguard other 
values and objectives such as plurality of sources and diversity of content threatened by 
excessive market concentration. Recognising that competition legislation is insufficient to 
secure media pluralism and diversity, a number of countries have introduced measures to 
protect these social concerns. These measures include content regulation, encompassing 
the preservation of public service broadcasting, as well as media and cross-media 
ownership rules. The analysis of such measures falls outside the scope of this paper, but 
further research should assess the effectiveness of competition policy to meet wider 
social objectives such as pluralism and diversity. 
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Endnotes 
 
1
 A company is said to be in a dominant position when it has control of the total process, 
from raw material to distribution to sales. This situation implies power to seize out 
potential competitors and distorts the economy with monopolistic control over prices.   
2
 See decisions in cases:  
- IV/M.410 – Kirch/Richmond/Telepiu 
- IV/M.469 – MSG Media Service 
- COMP/M.1574 – Kirch/Mediaset 
- COMP/JV.37 – BskyB/Kirch Pay-TV. 
3
 Case No COMP/M.2050-Vivendi/Canal Plus/Seagram, Brussels 13.10.2000. 
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4
 A firm may play a gate-keeper role if it possesses a certain technology, know-how or 
technical standard that allows it to exert a significant degree of control in respect of the 
access to a given market.  
5
 It is worth noting that the deal had already secured approval in the US from the Federal 
Trade Commission. 
6
 Retrieved January 2, 2005, from 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/20/sony_merger_approve 
7
 The package includes the following elements: a directive on the common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services (framework directive); 
an authorisation directive; an access and interconnection directive; a directive on 
universal service and users‟ rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services; and a decision on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy. 
8
 Merger deals are also diversification ones. Diversification is the move of a business into 
other areas of businesses. It can be product extension (adding a product to an existing 
product line) or geographical extension and normally involves operations concerning 
different product markets. In this respect there is some confusion over the terms of 
diversification and vertical integration. However, the two processes are distinguishable, 
for they are driven by different management logic. Diversification means the entry into 
new different markets which are not likely to be infected by a particular economic trend 
that affects the market therein (the market may have reached saturation, for example). On 
the contrary, vertical integration is about integrating a market (Auerbach, 1988, pp. 231-
233). 
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9
 A more recent intended merger that confirms the trend towards combining distribution 
with content was the $54 billion bid by the largest US cable operator Comcast to takeover 
Walt Disney Co. However, in April 2004 Comcast withdrew its offer after Disney 
executives expressed no interest in the takeover. 
10
 Canal Plus since has sold nearly all of its international operations except those in 
Poland, cutting a major source of losses. 
11
 For example, see Case No IV/M.553 – RTL / Veronica / Endemol, OJ L 134/32, 
5.6.1996, paragraphs 24, 89, 90. 
